SRM attrition rate study of the aft motor case segments due to water impact cavity collapse loading by Crockett, C. D.
General Disclaimer 
One or more of the Following Statements may affect this Document 
 
 This document has been reproduced from the best copy furnished by the 
organizational source. It is being released in the interest of making available as 
much information as possible. 
 
 This document may contain data, which exceeds the sheet parameters. It was 
furnished in this condition by the organizational source and is the best copy 
available. 
 
 This document may contain tone-on-tone or color graphs, charts and/or pictures, 
which have been reproduced in black and white. 
 
 This document is paginated as submitted by the original source. 
 
 Portions of this document are not fully legible due to the historical nature of some 














^IA A TM X- 73303
SRM ATTRITION RATE STUDY OF THE AFT MOTOR
CASE SEGMENTS DUE TO WATER IMPACT CAVITY
COLLAPSE LOADING
By Charles D. Crockett
Systems Analysis and Integration Laboratory
(NASA-TM-X-73303)	 SEE. ATTRITION BATE STUDY N76-24620
OF THE AFT MOTOR CASE SEGMENTS DUE TO WATER
IMPACT CAVITY CCILAPSE LOADING	 (NASA)	 50 p
JHC $4.00	 C SCL 21B UnclasG3/39 28247
May 1976
NASA
George C. Marshall S ace Flight
 Center
Marsha/6.. Space  Fli ht Cnterg aAlabam






b1SFC - Form 3190 (Rey June 1971)
`	
r'.-w
.tn.'y	x. cT^,ak	 a, t" k,	 k	 ^•3Gf%a	 'wM1W.1'M+;.."Y °dWwro."
yy4
2,.....» .,. 	 r	 "Z: .rar.+itS,a=KS-,^"-Yt'•"ini^^MYii.^id^'.e.:^%(eud',..aG...1.4-d1uM
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION	 .......................... 1 r'.........
BACKGROUND .... .. .........	 ........
	
...... 1
LOADS....	 .............	 .............	 .	 .. 2
CONFIGURATIONS 3...........	 ...	 ..	 ...	 ..
i..
COMPUTER PROGRAM "SPLASH' S
	................. 3
9
, STRUCTURAL CAPABILITIES .. 4
BUCKLING ANALYSIS COMPUTER PROGRAMS .............. 5
METHODOLOGY DEVELOPMENT ............
	 .	 ...... 7
POSITIONAL (SHIFT) FACTOR .............
	 ..	 .... .... 7
SUBFACTORS FOR IMPERFECTIONS AND ASYMMETRY ........ 8
3
#
VERTICAL VELOCITY/ STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY 4 ,_
DISCRIMINATORS	 ...	 .	 .. 8 i
PROGRAM COSTS	 ... ..
	 ..	 .	 ... 9
1
LOSS OF ENTIRE SRB ... 	 .	 ..	 ..	 ..... 9
a
I














1. SRM ullage pressure as a function of ullage gas tempera-
turc; at water impact 	 ........................ 31
2. Aft motor case positional probability — equal probability
of load peak within :L D/4 ( 36. 5 in. ) of as shown
position.	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . 32
3. Typical SRM clevis	 joint ...................... 33
4. Typical SRM aft segment cavity collapse bolt-on-rings. 34
t
5. Comparison of STAGS linear and nonlinear bucklingj analysis .	 .	 .	 ..........	 ..	 ...	 . 35, y`
G. Comparison of critical cavity collapse SRM capabilities,
three rings	 ................................ 36
7. Comparison of critical cavity collapse SRM capabilities,
two rings	 .	 ...	 ....	 ..........	 .	 ....... 37
8. Aft motor case cavity collapse attrition rate, maximum
differential pressure method .................... 38
9. Aft motor case cavity collapse attrition rate, positional
differential pressure (3M AP) method ............. 39
10. Aft motor case cavity collapse attrition rates versus
' VV, differential pressure method ................. 40	
--,
y
11. Aft motor case cavity collapse attrition rate methodology
comparison, VV 85 ft/ sec, three rings, eigenvaluos .... 41
12. Aft- motor case cavity collapse attrition rate methodology
comparison, VV 85 ft/sce, ttivo rings, eigenval.ues ..... 42	 n





2.	 SRM Aft Segments Cavity Collapse Maximum Differential









1.	 SRM Aft Segments Cavity Collapse Maximum Differential





3. Comparative Results of Cavity Collapse Buckling
Analysis Versus Computer Program Options ......... 15
4, Representative Eigenvalues of the Cavity Collapse Load
i
r
Shifted Forward from as Shown Position to Critical
Location ( Max + D/ 4, 36.5 in.) , Three Rings ........ 16
5. Representative Eigenvalues of the Cavity Collapse Load
Shifted Forward from as Shown Position to Critical
Location (Tdax + D/4, 36. 5 in.) , Two Rings
	 .........
16
6. SRM Aft Segments Minimum Eigenvalue Matrix Cavity
Collapse, Scale 0.605, Symmetrical Loads 120/0/0, .
100/ 0/ 0, and 80/ 0/ 0 Scale 0. 75, Three Rings 	 ....... 17
7. SRM Aft Segments Cavity Collapse Eigenvalue Matrix, as





8. SRM Aft Segments Cavity Collapse Eigenvalue Matrix,
as Shown, Scale Factor 1. 0, Two Rings 	 ............ 10
9. SRM Aft Segment BOSOR Eigenvalues for the Water Impact
Cavity Collapse Condition (V= 85 ft/ see), Three andVTwo Ring Configuration ........................ 20
10. SRM Aft Segments Cavity Collapse Minimum Eigenvalues,












LIST OF TABLES (Concluded)
Table	 Title	 Page
11. SRM Aft Segments Cavity Collapse Minimum Eigen.values,




	 ...	 .............	 . 22
12. SRM Aft Segments Cavity Collapse Eigenvalue Matrices
Shifted Fore and Aft (+36.5 inches) , Scale Factors 0.605,
0.675, 0. 75, Three Rings .	 ...	 .. ............ 23
13. SRM Aft Segments Cavity Collapse Eigenvalue Matrices
Shifted Fore and Aft (36.5 inches), Scale Factors 0.605,
0^ 675,	 0. 75, Two Rings	 ........ ,
	 ....... 24





15. SRM Aft Segments Attrition Rate Assessment , ....... , 26
16. SRM Aft Segment Cavity Collapse Test Program Costg	 t3'	 P	 g 26
Assessment (Three Ring Configuration) 	 ............
17. SRM Aft Segment Cavity Collapse Test Program Cost
Assessment (Two Ring Baseline Configuration)
	 ....... 27
18. Sensitivity Assessment of SRB Attrition/ Cost Versus
Segment Attrition/ Cost Assuming a 10 Percent Increase
141 Structural Criticality 	 ....................... 28
19. Methodology Comparisons of SRM Aft Segments Attrition
Rate Assessment .
	 ....	 ....	 ..	 . 29
20. _ Methodology Comparison of SRM Aft Segments Attrition






SRM ATTRITION RATE STUDY OF THE AFT MOTOR




Cost optimum designs of the Solid Rocket Motor ( SRM) requires adequate
assessment of attrition resulting from reuse.	 The critical attrition rate for
the SRM results from the water impact cavity collapse 'loading. 	 The attrition
assessment treats these loadings probabilistically and determines if these
loadings exceed the structural capabilities of the designed vehicle.
The cavity collapse loading is unique in that it drastically changes the
It
shape of the pressure wave with water impact conditions. 	 This requires a t
number of stress analyses to determine capability for each pressure distribution. 1
For most other water impact loads, a single analysis is sufficient and the capa-
bility is linearly proportional to a load such as pressure.
A significant problem of compcater economics ( cost and schedule) was s'
created in computing a capability for each load condition. for three positional
locations and for multiple configLiration design options.
Resolution of the problems for preliminary assessment of the attrition
Y;	 rates of the SRM aft -segments is discussed herein,
BACKGROUND
The attrition assessment of the alt segments of the SRM due to water
r	 impact requires the establishment of a correlation between loading occurrences ,	 µ
and structural, capability.
g
The critical_ loading for the aft segments of the SRM during water impact
is the cavity collapse condition. 	 Seventy-five discrete loading cases have been r	 r
empirically detemnined as functions of vertical impact velocity (VV) , horizontal











Each discrete load case as identified by the parameters VV/VIl/0,
varies longitudinally and radially in magnitude and distribution of the external
pressure. The distributions are further required to be shifted forward or aft
one-fourth the vehicle diameter to assure minimization of the effect of test
instrumentation location for the load determinations. The asymmetrical load
distributions result in large geometric nonlinearities in structural response.
The critical structural response is progressive buckling of the case. Discrete
stiffeners have been added to these aft segments to aid in gaining maximum
structural capability for minimum weight addition for resisting these loads.
4
Structural capabilities (eigenvalues) have been calculated using the
buckling of shells of revolution (BOSOR) program and scaled using nonlinear
structural analysis of general shells ( STAGS) program. These are converted
to factor-of-safety values and used as input to the SPLASIi program for attrition
assessment.
Other methods described herein were evaluates]. progressively to arriveT	
at the preferred solution. The preferred' solution is considered to be more
realistic than other methods investigated and yet inherently retains conservatism
resulting from the use of constant minimum correction factors for each input
matrix. Accuracy may be somewhat improved as results of a greater number
of STAGS runs become available and as configuration changes and load. revisions
are completed; however, the results shown are not expected to change signifi -
cantly.
LOADS
The load parameters utilized for the attrition assessment are documented
	 j
in SF-019-057-2II, "Space Shuttle Solid Rocatet Booster Design Loads, Revision
A, September 12, 1975." All motor case analyses include a 2.0 psig super-
mpos-ed, thermally induced vacuum s, own in Figure 1,
Tables 1 and 2 list the magnitudes of the external cavity collapse Ares-
sure "shown in the referenced docuinent as a function of VV, VIl , and 0.
Table 1 is-a single matrix of the poak pressure which can fall on the
motor case forward of the first clevis joint at station 1818. 0, including those
pressures whose distributional magnitude on the case would increase if shifted
forward 36. 5 in. This is a worst case pressure distribution and is the matrix
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Table 2 shows three matrices of pressure, which define the limits of
the pressure intensities as they are shifted fore and aft ( Figure 2) Matrix 2
is the peak pressure shown in the reference forward of station 1818.0 (the
nominal applied pressure) . Matrix 1 is the pressure at the same station if
the peak is shifted forward one-fourth the motor case diameter (36. 5  in.. )
Matrix 3 is similar except peak pressures are assumed to be shifted aft.
These matrices of loads were the basis of the early attrition studies
due to the ease of formulation of the natrices and the simplistic use of a single
capability. Inherent weaknesses of the methods are discussed in paragraph
Results.
CONFIGURATIONS
The design of the aft two segments of the SRM is defined as to length
(120 in. } , nominal wall thickness (0. 5111  in. ) , and spacing and configuration
of the bolt-on "T-rings. 11 Figure 2 shows the spacing of the rings and their
integ c al stubs for the aft two segments. 	 Economics indicated commonality was
preferable for these segments, the bolt-on rings, and their clevis (mating),
joints.	 The relative positioning of the peal,  pressure of a roprnsentative
load distribution is shown.
	 figure 3 shows the configuration of a typical clevis
joint and the geometric properties used in the analysis. 	 Figure 4 shows the
bolt-on ring configuration and analysis properties. 	 Each ring and its accessories
weigh 185.6 lb. * A
{
The nominal shin thickness was 'set by prelaunch and flight load require-
ments, while the ring configuration, spacing, and segment length were dictated
	
,t
by the water impact cavity collapse loadings.
COMPUTER PROGRAM "SPLASH"
The computer, program SPLASH' (SRB Probabilistic Loads for Attrition
of Subsystem Hardware) was utilized to assess the attrition rate of the aft 	 +
motor case subjected to the cavity collapse water impact loading. 	 This program
is a Monte Carlo analysis which treats the meteorological factors (wind,
sea, etc..) and the strength of each element probabilistically.' In general, each
1. Duane N. Counter: SPLASH Evaluation of SRB Designs: NASA TM X-64910;
MSFC, Alabama, October 1974.
3
F
defined criterion parameter (load or factor of safety) is programmed as a
table of input data for variations of VV, VII, - , ,j Q. For each Monte Carlo trial,
a water impact condition (VV , Vil , D) is randomly selected and the set: of loads
is computed by interpolation from the tables. The probability of strength is
included in the analysis to increase or decrease the effective Load. If a load
exceeds its companion strength, a failure is tabulated. The percentage of fail-
ures is the attrition rate.
The above described procedure is similar for the selection of factors of
safety as the criterion parameter. The only difference in the methodology is
the adjustment of strength by the strength ratio. 2 For loads input, the strengths
are multiplied by the inverse of the strength ratio.
A. separate version of the SPLASH program was developed to assess the
cavity collapse load. It includes the affect of shifting the load distribution with
an equal probability of it lying anywhere within a bandwidth of one-fourth the motor
diameter forward or aft of a critically determined station.
STRUCTURAL CAPABILITIES
The structural capability (lower limit of the ability of a structure to
carry a defined critical loading) of the SRM aft segments for water impact is
governed by the cavity collapse loads.
	
The criterion for the assessment of the
capability is the buckding load which would, if exceeded, result in damage to one
or both of the aft segments.
The capability can be indexed in several ways such as a factor of safety a( ratio of capability load to applied load) , the capability load itself ( applied load
times the safety factor) , or as variations of eigenvalues times correction factors.
An eigenvalue is a single-valued function which allows the arrangement
or ordering of members of a set. 	 As used in buckling analysis, it represents a
load -multiple. 	 A factor of safety can be considered an eigenvalue; however, as
used herein an. eigenvalue is defined as a buelding value- from either a linear
STAGS or BOSOR analysis.	 The eigenvalue must be -multiplied by a luiock-down-
factor (I DF) to determine the factor of safety. 	 The KDF attempts to account
for the nonlinearity of the bucking of a real physical system:
2.	 Thomas, Jerrell and Hanagud, S. c Reliability — Based Econometrics of ;t
Aerospace Structural Systems: Design Criteria and Test Options. 	 NASA
TN D-7646, June 1974.
4_ ^^((^"	 p,
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STAGS nonlinear analysis results carp 1---e considered factors of safety
directly.
For the attrition assessments using; the pressures as the discriminator,
the capability is defined as the critical factor of safety (nonlinear STAGS result)
times the critical pressure peals of the distrilz', ion used. R is assumed constant
r
for all conditions of VV/ Vit/ 0.. For the attrition assessments using eigenvalues
as the discriminator, the capabilities arc determined for each condition and are
expressed as a factor of safety.
BUCKLING ANALYSIS COMPUTER PROGRAMS
Primarily the BOSOR. grill STAGS compa►ter programs have been utilized
to elate to assess the bucking behavior of the SRM case subjected to R ;ter
f	 recovery loadings. These programs were developed by the Lockhecd Missiles
'	 and Space Compan y, Sunnyvale, California,with Government funding. TheY
Government has also funded prograni improvement from. time to tune. 	 r
early in the Shuttle program, a survey was made and testing performed
to evaluate analytical tools for use in design and analysis of the SLIM. Computer
programs were needed which could analyze the asymmetric nonlinear buckling
capability of Shuttle type motor cases reinforced by external rings, and/or
segment joints, subjected to external asymnictric loads. The BOSOR and the
STAGS program were assessed as having reasonably efficient computer utiliza-
tion time, good agreement witli test data, sufficient documentation, and user
experience to shorten learning time, and could be made available to any Shuttle
contractor at minimal expense. They were thus selected for S11M design
analysis.
The I30SOR program is primarily limited in that it treats asymmetric
loading in the radial, direction as if they wore symmetric, The STAGS (linear
option) program is also limited in that it neglects the nonlinear interactions of
the structural geometry. These program characteris ties, in general, under
estimate the Welding strengths and deflection magnitudes. These unconserva
'	 tisms are increased as the degree of geometric (structure/load) nonl.inearity,
and asymmetry are increased. The disadvantages of BOSOR and STAGS (linear
buckling) analysis are largely overcome by ease of programming and short
running times (often less than 8 min on a UNIVAC 114$) provided a deter-




IPrevious experience indicated a cori ntion KDF of 0.7 5 sbou d be
utilized. This resulted in reasonably good liucicling results for tliosa structures
symmetrically loaded but subjected to small imperfection sensitivity and/or
to those structures subjected to asymmetry of geometry or load. When judg-
inents required a factor greater than 0. 75, verification tests were established
for the cases without hull margins.
	 Y
The nonlinear STAGS analysis is accurate enough to be used uirectly
.	 without a KDF.	 This characteristic can also be used.t o derive a KDF and thus
use the more efficient linear analysis for the bulk of the evaluations.
	
The
numerical value of this factor ranges from 0. G for extremely asymmetric
cavity collapse loading distributions to 1.0 for symmetrical loadings.
	
The
lower bound of this ratio for the most critical desigli conditions is 0.605.
	 This
factor was assessed by Thiokol for the conditions 100/,30/45, 80/10/-5, and
85/10/-5,	 The factor using DOSOR analysis results as the numerator of the
3	 IMF ratio is 0. G a.
Viguro 5 is-a graphical comparison E,)I linear and nonlinear STAGS
analysis of percent load versus radial deflection at the critical longitudinal
position of the peals cavity collapse pressure for the pressure distribution of
condition V:V/ VII/ 0 (100/30/+5).	 Table 3 is a comparison of results of the
analysis methods and the resulting ratios KDF. 	 The nonlinear option of the
STAGS program, while having the capability of adequately assessing the non-
linear asymmetric buckling response of the structure, limits the number of
computer investigations due to runnjug dines of 3 to 7 h per solution.	 A worn-
able solution to the dilemma was to use the linear analysis for studies and
criticality assessments, followed by nonlinear analysis, for final results.
Due to the extensive number of buckling runs necessary to assess the
critical load cases, with respect to configuration optimization, load updating,
critical positioning', program. debugging, and refinement etc. , it was deter-
mined to use linear STAGS or BOSOR analysis for these early assessment for
economy of computer resources, and to use the STAGS nonlinear option only
for the final cbecks on the fewer selected critical cases.
Linear STAGS and BOSOR analysis was utilized for an n l , pis economy
to determine the critical loadings for each studied configuration.
	
Figures G
and 7 show graphically the results of the cigenvalue (BOSOR) analysis as a
utilized to determine the critical loadings as a function of vertical: velocity,
_,	
a
for the three-ring and two-ring configurations, respectively. The peak pros-
sure and an estimated "STAGS nonlinear" value are also shown for each load
case.
G
iMETHO DO(.:OG Y DEVELOPMENT
To develop the three positional matrices of factors of safety for attrif,ion
assessment, the following rationale was einployed:
I. The minimum IMF, as determined by the ratio of analysis results
of STAGS nonliacar to STAGS linear, would be the basis for the shift factors.
2. The XDT can be assumed to be composed of the product of three
subfactors:
a. A load shift factor.
b. An imperfection factor of 0.75.
c. An asymmetric factor of 0.9 determined by dividing; the KDr by
the product of subfactors for load shift and imperfections.
3. The forward shift factor is 0.9 and the aft shift ;factor is 1. 111 as
determined by BOSOR an(] STAGS linear analysis.
Using; this rationale, the scale factors to be applied to the BOSOR
analysis cihenvalues arc for the loads "as shown" (matrix 2):0,675, for loads
in the forward position (matrix 1) :0- 605, and for the loads shifter] aft (marix
3) ;0. 75, Those factors are the product of the imperfection and asymmetric
factor (0.675) timers the shift factor (U. 9 forward, 1.0 as shown, and 1.111
aft) .
POSITIONAL (SHIFT) FACTOR
I30SOR preliminary analyses were user] to select the critical conditions
of VV/V11lo. 1^or the conditions which indicated criticality, addit ional runs
_
were made with the loads distributions shifted to the most critical axial location
on the segment within the one-fourth diameter (36. 5 in.) limitation. The deter-
mining of this critical location; was initially a trial and error process. from
this family of cases shown in Tables 4 and 5, a ratio of cig envalues with the
load as shown was determined for the three-ring and two-ring; configurations,
7
Mf a
respectively. From these sets of data, a shift factor of 0.9 was representative
of the Increase of criticality of a forward shift of load for the three-ring con-
figuration and 0.85 for the two-ring configuration. The reciprocal of 0.9
(1.111) was selected as the corresponding; (improvement) factor for an aft
shift x, t both configurations.
SUBFACTORS FOR IMPERFECTIONS AND ASYMMETRY
The use of a suufactor for imperfections and asymmetry was purely
arbitrary. It was clone to aid in resolution of the paradox of reverse trends
resulting from the use of KDF. For symmetrical. circumferential loading; dis-
tribution, the KDF approaches one; however, conservative analysis historically
has applied a correction factor of 0.70 to symmetrical buelding analysis to
account for imperfection sensitivity as evidenced from testing. Analysis which
can assess the sensitivity of arbitrarily introduced imperfects indicates that
the 0.75 factor is significantly conservative. Analysis also indicates that highly
asymmetrically loaded structures are nearly insensitive to imperfections.
Ilowever, for asyirnmet 1441-i! loading, linear analysis is in error by a factor
ranging to nearly 40	 as represented by the maximtim KDF of 0.605
for the cavity collapse loads on the aft SRM segments.
It is noted that the product of these arbitrary subfactors is 0.675 and
is of interest in comparison with the historical factor of 0.75. The product of
these two subfactors has been utilized as a constant to develop the three posi-
tional matrices which only vary as a function of the shift factors.
V ,,'dle 6 presents input minimum eigenvalues used to deteri-aine the effect
on attrition of using a symmetrical 0.75 scale factor for the three symmetrical




Tables 7 and 8 are the uncorrected ( scale factor 1.0) BOSOR cigen
value matrices as functions of VV/ V11/ 0 for the cavity collapse water impact






These results are for loads represented in matrix 2 of Table 2, These 'matrices
form the basis for development of positional factor of safety matrices used for
the attrition assessment.
Table 9 presents uncorrected BOSOR eigenvalues for the vertical velocity
of 85 ft/ s loadings. These values wog•-:, used as checks on interpolations of 	 r
values within the SPLASH program for vertical velocities between 80 and 100
_	 ft/ s.
Tables 10 and 11 present the adjusted ( scale factor 0. 60 a) BOSOR
eigenvalue matrices as functions of VV/Vfl/0 for the condition of the cavity
collapse load distribution shifted forward one-fou-1111 the motor diameter for
time three-ring and two-ring confi,Lirations, respectively. Tile 0e results would
correspond with loads represented in Table 1.
a
Tamales 12 (three-rin) and 1,3 (two-grin-,) present the three positional
'matrices to assess the equal probability of the load shifted Lore and aft 36.5 ins
Matrix Y (forward shil't), 'matrix 2 (as shown), and matrix 3 (aft shift) are the 	 ^.
eigenvalues sho«ni in Tables 7 and 8, respectively, multiplied by the positional
,a.
scale factors of 0. 605, 0.675, and 0. 76.
PROGRAM COSTS
Costs for trades were determined using total program costs of flight 	 a`,
hardware and spares as stated in the torrent cost per flight document. The
differential costs shown in Tables 14 through 18 result from watt'r impact
attrition only. Total program costs do reflect time total attrition; however,
general attrition is a constant and its costs have been subtracted for differential
trade consideration. All costs are in FY75 dollars.
LOSS OF ENTIRE SRB
r
Y
Throughout: this study it has been assumed that loss of an SRM cyclinder
will not prevent recovery of the SRB, which is a baselined attrition analysis
assumption. Ilowever, this assumption has major cost implications. Leakage










nozzle and, thus, prevent recovery , of the SRB. The critical factors are the	 r
size and location of the hole or crack generated, and whether the resulting log
mode flotation angle will allow towing the SRB into the Indian River. An esti-
mate of the cost if the plug cannot maintain a satisfactory log mode for towback
is obtained by assuming that the ultimate capability of the case is 10 percent igreater than the stability capability ( the same criteria used for slapdown loads
on the forward segments), These attrition rates for the loss of an "entire SRB'T
are assessed and discussed in the R-;sults and Conclusions paragraph.
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
{
Ttible 19 presents a summary and methodology comparison of the attrition
rate assessments, Table 20 presents a comparison of the range of attrition
	 r
values for the baselined velocity for evaluation of the sensitivity of the analysis
methods. The attrition rates shown in the tables are clue to water impact only.
Figures 8 through 13 show the results of the attrition studies as progressively
developed. Attrition rates (in percent) are showii for the V of 85 and 100 ft/sV
and for the three-ring and two-ring configurations. Four methods are identified:
	
o
two methods using peak pressure and two methods using factors of safety ( scaled
eigenvalues)
The methods identified. as "max AP" or "min eigen" use a maximized
single matrix of the largest pressure or minim-Lan factor of safety for each
VV/VH/0 without positional probability considerations.
The methods identified as 11 3M OP" and "3M cigen" consider positional 	 1
probabilities.
fi
Due to the nonlinear structural response, the nonlinear peak load, and
load distribution characteristics, the structural criticality is not proportional
to the leak load. This necessitate(! the use of the minimum pressure capability
!	 within the arbitrarily defined envelope of conditions of V V/VlT/0 of 100/45/±5.
The use of this minimum pressure capability (nonlinear STAGS result tines
the peak pressure) for the max A P method results in highly conservative
attrition rates. The conservatism is introduced from the neglect of the posi-
tional probabilities and, more significantly, the use of a single capability
established by a low frequency of occurrence event (100/30/-1-5 or 80/16/-5).
The 3M (AP) method reduces, the con',nervadsm, but still has the deficiency of
using a single low frequency of occurrence pressure capability.
Dj
s	 1U
iThe eigenvalue methods are preferred; their single point of difficulty
is the extensive analysis required. While a constant KPT is used for each
matrix set, this improves the realism of the results since the asymmetry
effect is similar for a. high percentage of the load cases; each load event (VV/
Vll/li) capability is treated in accordance with its frequency of occurrence.
The 3M eigen method is conservative and is the best interim estimate
of motor case attrition.
The method outlined in this report utilizing factor of safety matrices
for load positioning as input to the SPLASH program will provide a compatible
attrition rate assessment with other SRB assemblies. Using this method (3M
eigen) the attrition rate of 0.4 percent for the three- or four--ring configuration
and 1.3 percent for the two- ring configuration for the vertical velocity of 85 ft/ s
td T bl 4	 4.0 f 4-U SR	 f	 tare de ermine	 a e 1 assesses a program costs o ie _ Mat segmen 	 -:
cavity collapse rings for the four-, three-,and two-ring configurations. The
study indicates a program saving of $1.9 million by removing the first
cavity collapse ring. Removal of a second ring results in a program cost
penalty of $ 1.1 million:
The absolute value of this attrition assessment for the four-or three-ring
configuration is considered slightly conservativo and may lie further reduced
as additional analysis results are provided. The attrition assessment for the
two-ring configuration is considered slightly unconservative primarily because
of the limited number of "nonlinear STAGS" investigations made.
The apparent 1.0 percent differences in attrition rates of the fc, r •-- or
three-ring configuration and the two-ring configuration indicates that the dollar
value of weight reduction must be greater than $13/lb (added to a single SRB) 	 t	 ;=
per flight (of two SRB) for the removal of the third ring (185.6 lb of ring weight
per .3RB) to have a beneficial cost effect. 	 1
Table 15 compares the attrition rates of the ring, configuration options
at the baselined VV of 85 ft/ s with respect to structural verification testing.`
If structural verification testing is not performed, the attrition increase to
2.68 and 7.1percont for the three/four ring and two-ring configuration, respec-
tively. Figure 16 shows a $ 7.6 million increase in program costs for the three-
ring configuration if verification testing is not performed. The increase in
program cost is $11.3 million for the two-ring configuration.
11
ri
aTable 18 shows the results of a sensitivity assessment of loss of an
entire SRB (for the baselined vertical velocity), assuming the ultimate
capability (point at which sinkage would occur) of the case is 10 percent greater
than the stability capability. The losses of entire SRB attritions are,- 0.2 per-
cent and 0.9 percent for the three-ring and two-ring configurations, respectively.
All analyses contained herein have retained the integral stubs on both
aft segments, regardless of the number of stiffener rings employed. Their
stiffness is required for the capabilities and attritions stated and segment
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TABLE 2 SRMAFT SEGMENT$ CAVITY COLLAPSE MAXIMUM
DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE (A P, PSIG) SHIFTED
 FORE
AND AFT (^36.5 INCHES)
- I	 -	 k	 --	 -
CONDITION LOAD DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE (PSIG)
VV VH THETA

































80, 30. 51 16000+03 .18500+03 .11500+0310, .75000+02 .95000+02 .65000+0280. 45. -10. .45000+02 .30000+02 .0000080. 45. - 5,
.65000+02 50000+02 .50000+0280. 45. 0. 13000+03 ,11000+03 .60000+0280: 45 5: 15500+03 15000+03 11000+0380 45, 10
: 
15500+03 .18000+03 13000+0380. 60. -10, .80000+02 10000+02 .00000so , 60, - S. 170000t02 .20000+0280. 60, ol 70000+02 50000+02 .30000+0280, 60, 5. 10500+03 .95000+02 .70000+0280• 60. 10. .15000+03 15000+03 12000+03100 0 -10 17500+03 M500+03 .20500+03loo:
100, 0, - 5: :13000+03 15000+03 .20000+030. 0. 10000+03 .12500+03 .12500+03100, ol 51 .13000+03 15000+03 20000+03100. 0. 10. .17500+03 .21500+03 .20500+03100, 15, -10 .15000+03 18000+03 .13000+03
100, 15. - 5, 21000+03 24000+03 .16500+03100. 15. 0. .20500+03 .21500+03 .16500+03100. 15. S. 95000+02 10500403 .70000+02100, 15. 10, .14500+03 .17000+03 20000+03
100. 30. -10. 10000+03 .95000+02 .65000+02100, 30, - 51 .14500+03 .16500+03 12000+03100. 30. 0 21500+03 .24500+03 .14500+03100. 30, 51 .21500+03 .25500+03 .21500+03100. 30. 10, 10000+03 11500+03 .10000403100, 45, -10. .80000+02 .60000+02 .35000+02100. 45. - 51 .11000+03 .10000+03 .65000+02100, 45. ol .13000+03 .15000+03 .11000+03100. 45, 5. .21500+03 24000+03 .17000+03
100. 45, 10, .21500+03 .25200+03 17000+03100. 60, -10, .40000+02 20000+02 .00000
100, 60. - 5. .70000+02 .20000+02 .00000
Im 60, ol '1500+03 .10500+03 .50000+02
100. GO. 5. .15000+03 15000+03 13000+03
100. 60, 1% 16500+03 .20000+03 .15000+03
120. 0. -10, .23000+03 28500+03 23000+03
120, 0. - 5. M000+03 26500+03 .24000+03
120. 0. 0. 13000+03 .15000+03 15000+03
120. ol 5, .22000+03 .26500+03 .24000+03
120. 0. 10. 23000+03 .28500+03 23000+03
120, 15, -10, 19500+03 21500+03 .20000+03
120, 15, - 5. .30000+03 33000+03 28000+03
120, 15, 0. .22500+03 .28500+03 .22500t03
120, 15. 51 13000+03 .14500+03 13000+03
120, 15. 10. .23500+03 .25500+03 .25000t03
120. 30, -10, 14500+03 14000+03 .12500+03
120. 30, - S. .20000+03 .20000+03 .16500+03Irr
120, 30. ol 28500+03 .32000+03 28500+03
120. 30. 5. 25000+03 .30000+03 .25000+03
120, 30, 10, A4500+03 J5000+03 .15000+03'
120. 45, -10. .11000+03 .11000+03 .85000+02
120, 45, - 5. .13000+03 J1500+03 .10000+03
120. 45, 0. 13000+03 .16500+03 .15000+03
120, 45. 5. .28000+03 30500+03 26000+03
120. 45. 10. 26500+03 .30500+03 .23000+03
120, 60. -10, .80000+02 .65000+02 .45000+02
120, 60. - 51 10000+03 95000+02 .65000+02
120. 60. 0. .13500+03 J1500+03 95000+02
120. 60, 51 .17500+03 .20000+03 .17500+03
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1 TABLE 4. REPRESENTATIVE EIGENVALUES OF THE CAVITY COLLAPSE
' LOAD SHIFTED FORWARD FROM AS-SHOWN POSITION TO CRITICAL
LOCATION ( MAX + D/ 4 1 ,36. 5 IN.) , THREE RINGS
CONS DITION	 EIGENVALUI: RATIO
(A) LOAD SHIFTED	 (B) LOAD AS SHOWN A/8
80/0/0	 2.488	 2.704 0.92 r
80/15/•5	 1.667
	 1.896 0.88
80/30/+5	 1.748	 1.969 0,89









s USE SHIFT FACTOR 0.90 (MEAN)
,f
TABLE 5. REPRESENTATIVE EIGENVALUES Or TILE CAVITY COLLAPSE
LOAD SHIFTED FORWARD FROM AS-SHOWN POSITION TO CRITICAL
LOCATION ( MAX + D/4, 36.5 IN.) , TWO-RING
CONDITION	 EIGENVALUE RATIO
(A) LOAD SHIFTED	 (B) LOAD AS SHOWN A/B
80/0/0	 1.139 1.168 0.97
80/16/-5	 1.612 1.896 0,85
80/30/+5	 1.7481 , 1.945 0.90
100/0/0	 1.441 1.710 0.84
100/0/-5	 1.273 1.461 0.87
100/30/+5	 0.639 1.298 0.49
100/15/+10	 1.283 1.451 0.88
100/15/-5	 1.269 1.410 0.90
r
80/0/-5	 1.826 1.953 0.93
USE SHIFT FACTOR 0.85 (MEAN)
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TABLE 12. SRM AFT SEGMENTS CAVITY COLLAPSE EIGENVVALUE
MATRICES SHIFTED FORE AND AFT (:ERA 5 INCISES) I-A V.
FACTORS 0.605, 0.675, 0.75, THREE RINGS




t{FT SEC) (FT/SEC) (DEGREES) MATRIX _I MATRIX 2 MATRIX 3
,^ -10. .12088+01 13486+01 14985+01B0. 0,
- 6. 11016+01 ,13183+01 ,14647+0180, 0, 0, ,16359+01 ,18252+01 ,20280+01 J80, 0, 61 111816+01 ,13183+01 ,14647+01 I80, 0, 10. .12088+01 13486+01 .14985+01 j80, 15,
-10, 18604+01 ,20756+01 ,23062+01
80, 16.
- 5, .11471+01 ,12798+01 .14220+01
80, 15, 0. ,12765+01 ,14242+01 .15825+01
80, 15. 51 ,25773+01 28755+01 .31950+0180, 15, 10, .14568+01 ,16254+01 .18060+01
80+ 30,
-10, 20025+01 ,22342+01 24825+01
80, 30.
- 5. .15373+01 .17152+01 .19058+01
90. 30. 0. .13576+01 ,15147+01 .16830+01
80, 30. 5. 111912+01 .13291+01 .14767+01
80. 30, 1D, .20443101 ,22808+01 25342+01
80. 45, -10,
.47057+01 .52501+01 58342+0180, 45. - 51 45097+01 ,20574+01 55905+01
B0. 46. 0. .18440+01 .16200+01 2286001
80, 45, B. 14520+01 •11718+01 .180017+01
80. 45. 10, .10503+01 ,11718+01 ,13020+01
80, 60, .-10. .48400+01 54000+01 .60000-01
80. 60,
- 5, 48400+01 ,54000+01 160000+91
1
80, 60. 0, 27225+01 .30375+01' .33750+01
A90. 60, 5, .19360101 .21000+01 .24000+01
80. 60, 10. 113915+01 ,15525+01 .17250+01
100, 0.
-10, .81070+00 .90450+00 •10050+01
i 100, 0. - 51 85849+00 .05782+00 .10642+01
100. 0, 0, .15204+01 ,16963+01 18848+01
1J0. 0. 5, 85849+00 •95782+00 .10642+01 a
100, 0, 10. ,80949+00 90315+00 .10035+01
100. 15, -10. 111108+01 .12393+01 .13770+01 i100. 15,
- 5. .85305+00 ,95175+00 .10575+01
100. 15, 0. .88874+00 .99157+00 .11017+01
100, 15, 5. 15355+01 .17131+01 19023+01
100.. 15, 10; ,86454+00 96457+00 ,10718+01
100. 30. -10, 19360+01 .21600+01 .24000+01
100, 30. - 5, .12318+01 .13743+01 .15270+01
100. 30, 0. ,83913+00 93622+00 .10402+01
100, 30, 51 ,73991+00 .82552+00 91725+00
100, 30, 10, 19330+01 .21566+01 .23962+01 a
100. 45.
-10, .38296+01 .42727+01 ,47475+01100. 45. - 5, ,20727+01 .23179+01 .25695+01
100. 45; 0. 13667+01 .1524d+01 .16943+01
t
100. 45. 5. .90084+00 .10051+01 11167+01 .`!
100, 45, 10, ,76411+00 .85252+00 ,94725+00
100, 60. -10, ,48400+01 54000+01 60000+01
100, 60. - 5, ,47190+01 52650+01 58500+01
100. 50, 0. ,19360+01 •21600+01 :24000+01
100, 60, 5. .13915+01 15525+01 .17250+01
100. 60, 10, ,84700+00 ,94500100 .10500+01 i
120. 0, -14, ,66550+00 ,74250+00 ,82500+00
120,' 0, - 5. 65340+00 .72900+00 .81000+00 t'.	
1
120, 0, 0. .10963+01 .12231+01 13590+01
120, 0. 5; 65158+00 .72698+00 ,80775+00
120. 0. 10. .66550+00 74250+00 82500+00
120• 15, -10, ,82038+00 ,91530+00	 - .10170+01
120. 15. - 5, 56204+00 .62?07+00 69675+00
120, 15. 0, ,67760+00 ,75600+00 .84000+00
120. 15. 51 ;12820+01 14303+01 ;5892+01
120, 15, 10,_ .64009+00( .71415+00 79350+00
120. 30. -10, ,10950+01 12217+01 .13575+01
120. 30, - 5, .93654+00 .10449th. .11610+01
120. 30, 0, ,58987+00 65812+00 .73125+00
120. 30, 5, .63404+00 .70740100 .78600+00
120. 30, 10, .11307+01 12616+01 14017+01 q
120. 45. -10. ,20032+01 .22349+01 .24832+01
120, 45, +- 5, ,18150+01 20250+01 .22500+01
120. 45. 0. 71592+01 12933+01 .14370+01
120. 45, 5. 59350+00 66217+00 .73575+00
120. 45, 10. .63886+00 .71280+00 .79200+00
120. 00. -10, .19360+01 .21600+01 .24000+01
120. 60. - 51 .18755+01 20925+01 ,23250+01 i
120, 60, 0. ;15730+01 17550+01 .19500+01
120. 60. 5. 90387+00 .10084+01 .11205+01




TABLE 13. SRM AFT SEGMENTS CAVITY COLLAPSE EIGENVALUE
MATRICES, SHIFTED TORE AND AFT ( 4-36..:5 INCHES), SCALE
FACTORS 0.. 605 0
 0.675, 0.75, TWO RINGS
NDITION
IX H THETA FACTORS OF SAFETY( FT/SEC) (FT/SEC) (DEGREES) MATRIX 1 MATRIX 2 MATRIX 3
80. 0.
-10, 88935+00 .99225+00 ;11080, 0, — 5, .11816+01 ,13183+01 .14647+01
80. 0, 0. ,70664+00 78840+00 ,87600+00
80, 0. 6,. .11816+01 ,13183+01 .14647+01
80. 0, 10. .88935+00
.99225+00 .11025+01
80. 1. —10, .18bd4+01 .20756+01 .23062+01
80. 15,
— 5. ,11471+01 .12798+01 ,14220+01
80, 15. 0, ,12765+01 ,14242+01 .15825+01
801 15. 5. .23165+01 .25846+01 28717+01
80, 15. 10. ,14484+01 ,16159+01 .17955+01
80. 30.
—10, .20038+01 .22356+01 „24840+01
80, 30.
— 51 ,16373+01 .17152+01 09058+01
80. 30, 0. 13576+01 ,15147+01 ,16830+01
80, 30, 5, ,11767+01 113129+01 ,14587+01
00. 30. 16. 20443+01 22808+01 .25342+01
80, 45,
—10, .21102+01 23544+01 .26160+01
80. 45.
— 5. ,20824+01 .23233+01 ,25815+01
80, 45, 0. 18440+01 .20574+01 .22860+0180. 45, S. .14520+01 .16200+01 118000+01
80. 45, 10, ,10503+01 .11718+01 13020+01
80. 60.
—10. 21175+01 23625+01 ,26250+01
80. 60.
— 5, ,21175+01 23625+01 .26250+01
80, 60, 0. 19965+01 .22275+01 ,24750+0180. 60. 51 .12100+01 ,13500+01 .15000+01
80. 60, 10. .90750+00 10125+01 .11250+01
i	 { 100. 0. -10, .75443+00 .84172+00 93525+00100, 0,















100. 15. —10, ,11108+01 .12393+01 .13770+01
100. 15,
— 5. .85305+00 .95175+00 .10575+01
100. 15. 0, ,88874+00 .99157+00 ,11017+01
100. 15 5. 14314+01 .15970+01 17745+01
100. 15. 10, 77077+00 35995+00 .95550+00
100, 30.
—10. 19330+01 21566+01 ,23962+01
100. 30. — 5, .12318+01 ,13743+01 ,15270+01
100. 30. 0. ,83913+00 .93622+00 .10402+01
100. 30, 51 ,73991+00 82552+00 .91725+00
















100, 45. 5, 90084+00 .10051+01 11167+01	 f
100, 45. 10, 76411+00 85252+00 94725+00
100, 60. —10, ,21175+01 23625+01 ,26250+01
100. 60, — 5, 20570+01 ,22950+01 .25500+01
100, 60. 0. .12100+01 .13500+01 .15000+01
100, 60. 5. .90750+00 .10125+01 .11250+01
100. 60, 10. ,78650+00 .87750+00 97500+00
120. 0,
—10. .44346+00 49477+00 .54975+00
120, 0. — .5. 34122+00 .38070+00 .42300+00
120,  0, 0. ,53663+00 ,59872+00 .66525+00
120, 0, 5. ,34122+00 ,38070+00 ,42300+00
120. 0, 10.- 44346+00 .49477+00 ,54975+00120, 15. —10, .43620+00 48667+00 .54075+00
120, 15, — 5. .41866+00 .46710+00 51900+00
120. 15, 0, .62496+00 .69727+00 .77475+00
120, 15, 5. 12608+01 14067+01 115630+01
120. 15, 10. ,33335+00 37192+00 41325+00
120. 30. —10. 63525+00 ,70875+00 .78750+00
120. 30,
— 5. ,77258+00 86197+00 95775+00
120, 30, 0, .45798+00 .51097+00 .56775+00
120, 30, 5. .56446+00 62977+00 .69975+00
120. 30, 10. ,59713+00 .66622+00 .74025+00
120. 45,
—10. ,19989+01 ,22302+01 24780+01
	 t
120, 45. — 51 16250+01 .18130+01 20145+01









120. 45.	 5,	 ,50699+00 50565+00 ,62850+00
120, 45.	 10,	 ,59774+00 ,66690+00 ,74100+00
120. 60.	 —10,	 ,12100+01 .13500+01 .15000+01
	
1
120, 60,	 - 5.	 .11495+01 .12825+01 .14250+01
120. 60.	 0.	 .15730+01 17550+01 .19500+01
120, 60.	 5,	 61589+00 ,68715+00 76350+00
120. 60,
	
10,	 .42350+00 47250 52500+00
.r
24 IIN OF THEREPRODUCIBR
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	 STD. TEST	 NO TEST
3 OR 4 RINGS
	 0.42	 2:68
2 RINGS	 1.31	 7.10
NOTES.. 1. THE INTEGRAL STUDS ARE .RETAINED.
	 I2. FOR THE BASELINE VERTICAL VELOCITY
OF 85 FT/SEC.
TABLE 16. SRM AFT SEGMENT CAVITY COLLAPSE TEST PROGRAM
COST ASSESSMENT ( THREE-RING CONFIGUIIATION)
i
	TEST	 NO TEST
ATTRITION (%) 	 0.42 + 2.75 3.17	 2.68 + 1.75 = 5.43
AFT CYLINDER COST ($M) 	 57,586 	 64.038







DELTA ($M)	 0	 7.623'




TABLE 17. SRM AFT SEGMENT CAVITY COLLAPSE TEST PROGRAM	 fCOST ASSESSMENT (TWO RTNG BASELINE CONFIGURATION)
t TEST NO TEST
ATTRITION (%)	 1.31 + 2.75 - 4.06 7.10 + 2.75 = 9.85
AFT CYLINDER COST ($M)	 60.236 69.461
RING COST ($M) 	 4.087 6.119
TOTAL ($M)	 64.323 75.580
DELTA ($M)	 0 11.257
VV
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PROPERTIES STUB RING AND STUB
AREA	 (SO IN) 0.675 1.935
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SRM ATTRITION RATE STUDY OF THE AFT MOTOR
CASE SEGMENTS DUE TO WATER IMP rT  CAV I TY
COLLAPSE LOADING	 I
By Charles D. Crockett 1
a
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Classification Officer. This report, in its entirety, has been determined to be
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